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Abstract
Recent cross-country comparisons of bank efficiency have been based on pooled
estimates of banks across countries and have typically assumed a common frontier
and that differences in performance among banks are primarily due to disparities
in certain country-specific aspects of banking technology. This paper argues that
such comparisons of performance must take into account cross-country
differences in economic conditions, demographics, and regulatory structures
(environmental factors). Using a sample of banks from ten leading European
countries, this paper provides detailed evaluations of the efficiency of banks in
each country that operate both within and outside their own environments. The
results indicate that adverse (advantageous) environmental conditions are a
positive (negative) factor for the home banking industry and that technical
efficiency is a significant deterrence to foreign competition.
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Eurooppalaisten pankkien kansainvälinen tehokkuus
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 24/2000
Iftekhar Hasan – Ana Lozano-Vivas– Jesús T. Pastor
Tutkimusosasto
Tiivistelmä
Viimeaikaiset tutkimukset eri maiden pankkisektorin tehokkuudesta perustuvat
yhdistetystä pankkiaineistosta saatuihin arvioihin pankkien teknologiasta (kustan-
nusfunktioista). Näissä tutkimuksissa oletetaan tyypillisesti, että tehokkain saavu-
tettavissa oleva tuotantotekniikka on pankeille yhteinen ja että pankkien tehok-
kuuserot johtuvat joistakin määrittelemättömistä maakohtaisista tekijöistä. Tässä
tutkimuksessa väitetään, että tehokkuusvertailuissa on otettava huomioon myös
erot maiden taloudellisissa tilanteissa, väestörakenteissa ja sääntelyjärjestelmissä
(eli ympäristötekijöissä). Euroopan kymmenen keskeisen maan pankeista koostu-
van havaintoaineiston perusteella tässä tutkimuksessa arvioidaan yksityiskohtai-
sesti kunkin maan pankkien tehokkuutta niiden omassa ympäristössä ja sen ulko-
puolella. Tulosten mukaan haitalliset ympäristötekijät ovat kilpailuetuja kotimaan
pankkisektorille ja tekninen tehokkuus on avainasemassa ulkomaisen kilpailun
uhan torjunnassa.
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In recent years, banking sectors in most European countries have been subjected
to deregulatory initiatives and policy changes under the auspices of European
Union (EU). With banking integration as a goal, the European Commission
implemented two banking directives, which aim to liberalize the capital
movements among member countries. It is widely agreed that such initiatives will
significantly affect the degree of actual and potential cross-border competition in
the integrated banking sector.
1 Expecting a new cross border integrated
environment, banking authorities at the national level, initiated different
liberalization processes – a gradual lifting of interest rate restrictions, credit
controls and (in some cases) entry of new banks – aiming to improve bank
performance, and thus better prepare for new customers and competitive markets.
2
Following the Second Directive of the Union, the efficient banks in member
countries are hopeful to use their competitive advantage in the new setting of free
mobility – subject to the regulation of home country – without much difficulty. By
granting a single passport for financial services, such directives provide an
incentive for harmonization in the integrated market. Despite the enormous
potential, the immediate effect of the Directive has been limited to increased
consolidation of banks and banking markets at the local level and a modest
evidence of cross-country banking mostly in retail banking.
3 This observed lack of
integration of national markets could be explained by the lack of ample
information available to banks to better understand their ability to transform their
domestic comparative advantage or niche in foreign countries.
Given the key objective of the EU Banking Directives has been to foster
competition, the current differences in performance and productive efficiency
among the banking sectors of member countries will largely determine or
influence the future of the banking structure and competitive viability in
respective countries. Therefore it is important to know the true differences or
similarities of bank performance and efficiency among countries in order to better
predict and/or prepare effectively for the cross-border market and competition.
4
Such understanding would allow individual banks to bench mark their
performance and operating strategy in a foreign country.
Most international comparative analyses on bank efficiency so far have
focused primarily on determining the relative differences in performances across
banking industries. These papers estimate differences in efficiency across
countries building a common frontier by pooling all the cross-country banks and
assuming that banking efficiency disparity between countries are only due to
                                                
1 See De Bandt and Davis (2000), and Molyneux, Lloyd-Williams, and Thornton (1994).
2 The adoption of EU banking directives with their provision for mutual recognition, home country
supervision and the elimination of capital requirements for branches within EU countries has also
impacted the domestic competitive conditions.
3 See Berger et al. (2000) for details on intra-EU acquisitions and domestic consolidations. Gual
(1999) provides that banking competition in Europe focused mostly on variable costs would
expect a process of national concentration without generating in the medium term a significant
increase of EU wide concentration.
4 Altunbas and Chakravarty (1998) stressed on the importance of understanding the underlying
differences in the banking structure across Europe.8
some country-specific aspects of the banking technology.
5 In other words, the
existing studies of bank productivity and efficiency in a cross-national scenario
use a standard approach that assumes a common efficient frontier for all firms,
regardless of their home country.
Some recent studies attempted to control for local differences (Pastor,
Lozano-Vivas, and Pastor (1997), Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000)) by
introducing frontier estimates which incorporate country-specific environmental
conditions that account for cross-country distinctions in demographics,
regulations and economic conditions. These authors show that if such country-
specific environmental conditions are not accounted for, the relative efficiency of
firms is, usually, misstated. Recognizing the importance of such adjustments for
diverse environments, this paper analyzes bank performance in the context of the
integrated EU market and its member countries. Using a Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA) model, this paper expands and improves on existing
methodologies used in studying inter-country banking efficiency behavior by
defining an approach that can successfully predict what the efficiency of
institutions in one country would be if they were operating in another country.
This is the first such systematic multi-country analysis of average bank efficiency
which analyzes the potential cross-country performance by countries of the
integrated European Union.
Overall, the evidence indicates that average bank from Spain, Denmark,
Portugal and Belgium are predicted to maintain their high domestic efficiency
scores if they decide to expand business beyond their borders to any of the other
European countries. The evidence also indicates that adverse local environmental
conditions in Spain, Portugal and Denmark make it harder for banks from other
countries to establish and perform well in these markets.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the literature on
efficiency of foreign banks and cross-country comparisons. Section 3 presents the
methodology that predicts the mean cross-border efficiency behavior of European
banks. The description of the data and the specification of variables are reported
in Section 4. Section 5 presents the empirical results followed by the conclusions
in section 6.
2 Relevant literature
The X-efficiency literature on cross-country comparisons of banking institutions
has two perspectives. One deals with comparison of foreign-owned banks with
domestic-owned banks in the context of a single country. The other concentrates
on cross-country comparisons among banking institutions. In the first category,
the local business environmental factors are ignored as banks compete in the same
market within the country. Most of the studies in the literature under this category
are based on the U.S. market, and compare domestic-owned and foreign-owned
banks (Hasan and Hunter (1996), Mahajan, Rangan, and Zardkoohi (1996),
DeYoung and Nolle (1996), Chang, Hasan, and Hunter (1998), and Peek,
Rosengren, and Kasirye (1999)).
                                                
5 Berg, Førsund, Hjalmarson, and Suominen (1993); Fecher, and Pestieau (1993); Berg, Bukh, and
Førsund (1995); Bergendahl (1995); Allen and Rai (1996); Pastor, Pérez and Quesada (1997),
Bikker (1999), and Dietsch and Weill (2000).9
Overall evidence portrays foreign-owned banks as relatively less efficient
compared to their domestic counterparts. These papers concluded that in general
the foreign banks’ capacity to transfer their unique ability and management skills
in a different country is outperformed by the advantages associated with
performing business in the home country. However, these findings are not
uniform for similar comparisons in non-U.S. settings. Comparing acquiring
institutions in Europe, Vander Vennet (1996) did not find significant differences
in cost efficiency between foreign-owned and domestic-owned institutions
involved in such transactions. The author further reported that over the period,
foreign-owned banks tend to grow as more efficient institutions. Once adjusted for
production technology differences (Mester (1993)), by estimating separate
frontiers for foreign-owned and domestic-owned banking institutions in Spain,
Hasan and Lozano-Vivas (1998) found no significant differences between the two
groups.
Berger et al. (2000) extended this literature by comparing foreign-owned and
domestic-owned banks in several countries. Their paper stresses the importance of
disaggregated and separate frontier estimations based on the nations of origin.
Evidence indicates no clear-cut dominance – “home field advantage” – for local
banks relative to the foreign banks’ – “global advantage” – ability to transfer their
unique management efficiency abroad. An in-depth analysis of banks by foreign
nation of origin portrays mixed results where foreign-owned and domestic-owned
banks both outperform each other under some categories or groupings.
In the second category of this literature, most papers focus on the efficiency
of banks in multi-country comparisons. These papers trace variability in bank
performance across nations by setting a common frontier for all institutions. This
assumes that any differences in efficiency between countries can be explained by
country-specific banking technology (Fecher and Pestieau (1993), Berg, Førsung,
Hjalmarsson and Suominen. (1993), Berg, Bukh and Førsung (1995), Allen and
Rai (1996), Ruthenberg and Elias (1996), Pastor, Perez, Quesada (1997), and
Bikker (1999)). Most of these studies are based on European institutions however
the results did not produce any definite status or trends of bank efficiency of
European nations. As mentioned earlier, these initiatives also did not adjust for
country specific local environmental conditions or norms.
Recently, Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) analyzed banking sectors in
France and Spain and defined a common frontier that incorporates the country-
specific environmental conditions. The authors pointed out that the standard
approach could misstate the relative efficiency of firms from different countries,
because it does not account for cross-country differences in demographic,
regulation and economic conditions that are beyond the control of firm managers.
They also show how efficiency scores obtained from the standard approach are
artificially low (high) for firms that operate under bad (good) home country
conditions. Following a similar approach, this paper extends and improves on
existing methodologies used in inter-country banking efficiency studies by
defining an approach that can successfully predict the efficiency behavior (scores)
of the average bank from one country ‘i’ when it is assumed to be operating in
another country ‘j’.10
3 Methodological issue
To predict the cross-country efficiency behavior (scores) of banks,
6 first we
attempt to define the efficiency of each country’s banking industry in a cross-
national scenario.
At first, we evaluate the technical efficiency of the banking industry of
different countries by means of a DEA model. Initially, we consider ‘n’ basic
banking inputs and ‘m’ basic banking outputs for each bank and apply the Banker,
Charnes, and Cooper (1984) input-oriented model, BCC. The mathematical













where Y is the matrix of output-vector; X is the matrix of input-vector; (X0,Y0) is
the unit being rated; e
τ  denotes a row-vector of 1’s; τ  is the vector of intensity
variables; and θ  is the so called efficiency score – a quantity vector between 0 and
1 – if θ  is lower that 1, a proportional reduction of all inputs is needed in order to
reach the efficient frontier. This reduction is exactly given by (1–θ )X0, which
means that the projected unit given by (θ X0, Y0) is efficient in the sense of
Debreu-Farrell or DEA weakly-efficient. No further radial reduction of all inputs
is possible given the present amount of outputs. It is possible that, in order to be
Koopmans  – or DEA – efficient, further individual reduction in some inputs
and/or augmentation in some outputs is needed. To evaluate these mix-
inefficiencies we need to resort to a more complex BCC model, where a non-
Archimedean element in the objective function is multiplied by the sum of the
slack variables. However, if the slack variables are not important, we do not need
to further pursue this model.
7 The model defined is called the “basic DEA” model.
The model so far incorporates only banking variables; thus the measure
reflects a bias with regards to the “basic efficiency” of banks. This means that in
cross-country comparison, the efficiency measure continues to be influenced by
the environmental conditions of a bank’s respective country. Let us denote two
sub-indexes ‘i’ and ‘j’, associated with two specific countries, and θ ib, the basic
efficiency scores associated with country ‘i’.
In a second stage, a model called “Complete DEA” model, is developed in
order to disentangle the pure efficiency component from the effect of the
environmental factors in respective countries. Following Dietsch and Lozano-
Vivas (2000), we define a common frontier that accounts for differences in cross-
country banking technology as well as the differences in country-specific
environmental conditions. Since the regulatory and economic environmental
conditions banks face are very different in each country, the proper comparison of
                                                
6 Cross-country banking activity means average bank from one country to be operating in another
country. Actually, we calculate the average efficiency scores of the country, which we call average
bank behavior.
7 This is exactly what happens with the data in this paper – the amount of any slack value is always
less than 5 % of the corresponding variable value.11
banking efficiency across countries requires the definition of a common frontier
incorporating environmental conditions. Therefore, banks in each country would
be compared against the same standard. This complete model considers both the
banking variables and the environmental factors as inputs and outputs.
There are several ways to evaluate the influence of environmental variables in
a DEA framework (see Rouse, 1996). Here, we propose the simplest method of
considering environmental factors in DEA. That is, we incorporate environmental
variables directly into the “basic DEA” model. It is known that adding variables to
the DEA model raises the efficiency scores; our method of adding each
environmental factor guarantees that only the efficiency scores of banks from
countries with bad environmental conditions can change. This approach has a pre-
requisite: we must know in advantage the type of influence of each environmental
variable on the efficiency scores. In other words, each uncontrolled factor must
have an influence of known orientation.
To consider the environmental variables as inputs or outputs of our model we
just reverse their conditions: for example, if a given environmental variable is an
input type variable (“less means better”) we consider it as an output in our model
(see Cooper and Pastor, 1996). Moreover, all environmental variables are treated
as non-discretionary variables (Banker and Morey, 1986). The mathematical
















where Z denotes the matrix of selected environmental variables, and Z0 is the
corresponding vector of the unit being rated. Note that we consider all the
environmental variables on the output side. This is because any non-discretionary
input can be transformed into a non-discretionary output just by reversing its sign
and translating it. This procedure assumes that all the environmental factors are
treated as non-discretionary. The results obtained from this model are giving us
the “pure technical efficiency” of each country ‘i’, θ ic.
Based on these two models, we propose the following methodology to
undertake a systematic analysis of the efficiency position for each European
Banking industry if average banks decide to operate in any other foreign country.
Since the basic and the complete models constitute the two nested DEA models, it
is well known that θ ib ≤  θ ic. In fact we can write θ ib = λ i(θ ic), with λ i being a
positive number less or equal than 1 which accounts for the “negative” influence
exerted by the environmental conditions of country ‘i’ on the pure technical
efficiency score. If all countries have the same environmental conditions, then
their underlying banking systems could be compared on an equal footing, that is,
by means of θ ic. Since this is obviously not the case we have to resort to the basic
efficiency if we want to know the behavior of the average bank in a certain
country, given the environmental restrictions of that country. Therefore, we are
able to predict the efficiency behavior of the average bank from country ‘i’ if it
would operate in country ‘j’. In fact, the average basic efficiency scores, which12
would correspond to the average bank from country ‘i’ if it would operate in
country ‘j’, is λ j(θ ic).
4 Data and variables
Data: In our empirical study we use 1993 data of 10 European banking industries
for the definition and selection of the banking outputs and inputs. The data were
obtained from the BankScope International Bank Database. The lack of a
consistent and accurate data on labor across countries imposes certain restrictions
on the ability to obtain a homogenous sample of domestic and international banks
in terms of specialization. In our comparison we consider a sample of commercial
banks in each country.
We analyze the banking industries of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom (UK). Our
study is limited to these countries due to the scarcity of accurate data for a number
of countries and for certain samples of banks.
8 As a result, after carefully
checking the data for consistency, we have usable data for 612 commercial banks
belonging to 10 European countries: 24 Belgian, 29 Danish, 150 French, 203
German, 26 Italian, 68 Luxemburgian, 22 Dutch, 17 Portuguese, 28 Spanish and
45 British institutions.














    . All variables presented in value terms of local
currencies were converted into a common currency (U.S. dollar) using the
purchasing power parity hypothesis.
   
 In the banking literature, there have been
considerable disagreements regarding the “proper” definition of inputs and
outputs. Here, we follow the value-added approach (Berger and Humphrey
(1992)) to identify bank outputs. We specify three outputs: y1 = loans, y2 =
deposits,
9 and y3 = other earning assets.
10 In the value-added approach, all items
on both sides of the balance sheet may be identified as outputs depending on their
contribution to the bank’s generation of added value. In a value-added context,
deposits typically account for over half of the total capital and labor expenses at
banks and so, in this sense, output services are clearly being produced. We
consider labor and physical capital as inputs. Due to lack of direct measures, these
input variables are represented by appropriated proxy variables: x1 = personnel
expenses composed of all costs associated with employee wages and related
expenses, and x2 = non-interest expenses excluding personnel expenses.


 The environmental variables used in this paper are
macroeconomic variables and other variables explaining the particular features of
                                                
8 The selected sample can be considered as representative, given that it includes almost all the
banks classified as commercial banks in IBCA Ltd data base.
9 Deposits were defined as produced deposits (the sum of demand, savings, time, and other
deposits).
10 Earning assets were defined as the sum of all existing deposits with banks as well as short-term
and other investments.13
the banking industry of the respective countries. These features include economic
conditions, accessibility to banking services and regulatory conditions.
11
The first environmental variable income per capita, IC, of a country, is
defined as the ratio between Gross National Product over the number of
inhabitants. IC affects numerous factors related to the demand and supply of
banking services (mainly deposits and loans). Countries with higher IC are
assumed to have a banking system operating in a mature environment and
resulting in more competitive interest rates and profit margins. At the same time,
these mature banking systems are likely to exert more activity.
The second environmental factor, SC, or salary per capita, is an indicator of
each country’s economic performance. It is reasonable to hypothesize that high
levels of SC indicate high quality and potential high productivity of the labor
force, which should improve bank efficiency. The population density, PD, is
measured by the ratio of inhabitants per square kilometers. We assume that high
levels of PD should make retail distribution of banking services less costly, which
should improve bank efficiency. The density of demand, DD, measured by the
ratio of deposits by square kilometer, is assumed to be a relevant feature in
determining bank efficiency. Banks, which operate in markets with a lower
density of demand, incur higher expenses and may impose a ceiling on the
efficiency level attainable by their branches.
The above four environmental variables reflect the main economic conditions
in which banks exert their activities. Additionally, we define a set of
environmental variables that refer to the accessibility of banking services for
customers. Income per branch, IB, and deposit per branch, DB, are considered
usual measures of the relative efficiency of banking industries. We assume that
the higher the bank’s IB or DB, the higher the banking efficiency levels will be.
Branches per capita, BC, are an indicator of banking services. High levels of BC
imply high costs of providing banking services.
12 Additionally, the variable called
branch density, BD, is defined as the number of branches per square kilometer,
and is an indicator of the space dimension for each national market.
13 High levels
of BD indicate over dimension of the banking network and high operating
banking costs, which should reduce banking efficiency.
Finally, we use the average capital and profitability ratios as indicators of
regulatory and competitive conditions, respectively, of a country’s banking
industry. The average capital ratio is used as a proxy for regulatory conditions and
is measured by equity over total assets, EOTA. Usually, a lower EOTA leads to
lower efficiency levels, because less equity implies higher risk taken and greater
leverage. Finally, the profitability ratio is defined as average return over equity,
ROE, and is used as an indicator of the competitiveness in each banking industry.
The predicted relationship between ROE and efficiency is positive in a
competitive scenario, i.e. the larger the profits, the higher the efficiency.
The use of environmental factors within DEA models requires knowledge of
the influence of the environmental variables on efficiency scores. If we presume
that the higher (lower) the value of an environmental variable, the higher (lower)
the efficiency scores from the complete model, then we can say that the
environmental variable is an output type variable. On the other hand, if the
                                                
11 It is necessary to point out that our goal is not a micro level study but to determine the national
average efficiency levels. So that, macroeconomic explanatory variables would become relevant.
12 The variable BC has been defined as branch per 10,000 inhabitants.
13 See Fuentelsaz and Salas (1991).14
opposite relationship holds, we say that the environmental variable is an input
type variable.
14 Consequently, IC, SC, PD, DD, IB, DB, EOTA, and ROE are
classified as output type variables, while BC, and BD is considered as input type
variables. Following Cooper and Pastor (1996), the first 8 environmental factors
must be introduced as non-discretionary inputs and the last 2 factors as non-
discretionary outputs in a DEA model.
In order to define the complete model, first, we consider the whole set of 10
environmental variables. We implement a forward procedure (Pastor et al. (1999))
in order to incorporate only the influential environmental variables into our basic
model. This procedure concludes that DD, EOTA, IB, and SC are the pertinent
influential environmental variables in the complete model. Consequently, in total,
the complete model contains 9 variables that include 2 basic inputs, 3 basic
outputs and 4 more non-discretionary inputs corresponding to the above
environmental variables DD, EOTA, IB and SC.
15
Table 1 contains the average value of the influential environmental variables.
Overall, the values of these variables suggest large differences among countries in
terms of the particular economic, banking accessibility and regulatory conditions.
Particularly, Luxembourg has high levels of salary per capita and density of
demand. However, Portugal and Spain have the lowest level of these main
economic conditions. Thus, it may be harder to perform banking activities in
Portugal or Spain than in Luxembourg. In terms of the variables which refer to the
accessibility of banking services for customers, Belgium and Spain appear to have
conditions requiring high levels of bank operating costs given the level of
accessibility of banking services for customers. Finally, the mean value of the
capital ratio shows that there are important differences among countries in terms




Country SC DD IB EOTA
Belgium 30759 5.1403 0.0088 0.0398
Denmark 20617 1.3945 0.0320 0.0593
France 26964 0.9689 0.0328 0.0427
Germany 24197 3.2902 0.0256 0.0430
Italy 27038 1.5369 0.0317 0.0944
Luxembourg 28925 55.149 0.0324 0.0260
Netherlands 27588 5.6392 0.0296 0.0428
Portugal 13425 0.5611 0.0329 0.1437
Spain 23022 0.6538 0.0120 0.0962
U.K. 23107 1.9059 0.0689 0.0395
                                                
14 We use the environmental variables as categorical variables in our DEA model. Therefore, those
variables are organized as follows: a categorical input of the model corresponds to an output-
factor. For the analysis of categorical variables in DEA see Banker and Morey (1986).
15 The results of implementing this procedure is contained in the previous paper by Pastor,
Lozano-Vivas, Pastor, 1997.15
5 Empirical results
We start our empirical exercise by defining a common frontier based on the
standard approach, i.e. building a common frontier by pooling the data set of the
banks of all countries and considering a DEA model with 2 banking inputs and 4
banking outputs. This approach does not incorporate the country-specific
environmental conditions of respective countries. Table 2 reports the bank
efficiency scores for each of the sample countries by using this basic model, i.e.,
without taking into account the specific environmental conditions of each country.
The results show that Luxembourg gets the highest average basic efficiency
scores, around 49.5  % with Portugal, Spain and Denmark posting the lowest
scores, around 15.9 %, 18.9 % and 19.9 %, respectively.
Table 2. %;	;;:	;











However, to properly define a common frontier, potential differences explained
by the environmental factors should be accounted for. As we pointed out before,
after implementing a forward procedure in order to incorporate only the
influential environmental variables into our basic model, only DD, EOTA, IB, and
SC are selected as pertinent influential environmental variables in the complete
model. Consequently, in total, the complete model contains 9 variables that
include 2 basic inputs, 3 basic outputs and 4 more non-discretionary inputs
corresponding to the above environmental variables. We present results of such an
appropriate model in Table 3 where the average pure technical efficiency scores
for each country is obtained by means of the complete model.
16 When we
introduce these variables into the model, the average efficiency scores improve
markedly in almost all the countries with respect to the average efficiency scores
of the basic model (Table 2). Moreover, comparison of the new results with the
average basic efficiency scores of Table 2 shows that the worse the country-
specific conditions, the more improvement in the average efficiency scores. For
example, by observing the average rank position of the countries in terms of
environmental conditions (Table 1) Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy and
Belgium take the first, second, third and fourth places, respectively. The average
improvement in their efficiency scores is around 12 %. However, Denmark and
                                                
16 The results about the basic and pure technical efficiency scores are contained in the previous
study by Pastor et al. 1997.16
Spain, which are ranked on the bottom, obtain an improvement of around 60 % in
their average efficiency scores.
Table 3. (	;;*	;;:	;











After obtaining the average basic and pure technical efficiency scores for each
country, we focused on determining the cross-country bank performance i.e.
efficiency when the average countries’ bank decides to operate in each other’s
territory. Following the methodology described in section 3, we obtain the
efficiency of average bank of a particular country, which expect to do business in
a foreign country given the environmental conditions in such country. Table 4


























Belgium ￿￿￿￿￿ 20.93 46.90 36.56 60.94 63.01 57.29 15.88 18.26 29.86
Denmark 40.14 ￿￿￿￿￿ 44.61 34.77 57.97 59.94 54.50 15.11 17.37 28.40
France 21.80 10.81 ￿￿￿￿￿ 18.89 31.48 32.55 29.60 8.20 9.43 15.43
Germany 30.79 15.27 34.22 ￿￿￿￿￿ 44.46 45.97 41.80 11.59 13.32 21.79
Italy 17.61 8.73 19.57 15.25 ￿￿￿￿￿ 26.29 23.91 6.63 7.62 12.46
Luxemb. 33.14 16.44 36.84 28.71 47.86 ￿￿￿￿￿ 45.00 12.47 14.34 23.45
Netherl. 27.53 13.66 30.60 23.85 39.76 41.11 ￿￿￿￿￿ 10.36 11.91 19.48
Portugal 42.49 21.08 47.22 36.81 61.36 63.45 57.69 ￿￿￿￿￿ 18.39 30.07
Spain 43.70 21.68 48.57 37.86 63.11 65.25 59.33 16.44 ￿￿￿￿￿ 30.92
UK 31.20 15.48 34.68 27.03 45.06 46.59 42.36 11.74 13.50 ￿￿￿￿￿
The diagonal of Table 4 represents the average efficiency scores for each
country’s banking industry operating in its own market, given their particular
environmental conditions, i.e. the average basic efficiency scores. The column
estimates show the potential efficiency of other average countries’ banks
operating in the column country. For example, the 2
nd column of the table depicts
the efficiency scores of the average Belgian banks in Belgium and the efficiency
scores that average banks from other countries will get if they decide to assert
their banking activity in Belgium.
From Table 4, columns 3, 9 and 10 show the lowest efficiency scores levels.
Since such columns contain information about the average efficiency scores levels
that any European country will reach if it operates banks in Denmark, Portugal or
Spain, respectively, these results suggest that to establish banking activity in
Denmark, Portugal or Spain, will apparently be hard for any European country.
This difficulty is due to the adverse environmental conditions that are typical in17
these countries. Additionally, it seems that on average the Belgian, Danish,
Portuguese and Spanish banks have the highest average efficiency scores in their
countries, compared with others countries’ banks operating in Belgium, Denmark,
Portugal and Spain. Moreover, they also have maintained a high level of scores if
they decide to move to any other European countries. The average Italian banks
have the lowest efficiency scores level across the board. These results are in
accordance with the results obtained from the complete model, i.e. the pure
technical efficiency.
Overall, we are able to distinguish three different results portrayed by
combining the information from Table 3 and 4. (i) Countries with adverse
environmental conditions for banking business (given the low value that λ j takes),
yet whose banks reach high levels of average pure technical efficiency (given the
high value that the efficiency level on Table 3 takes). Such is the case of Portugal,
Spain, and Denmark. (ii) Countries with advantageous environmental conditions
(high value of λ j), but their banking sector does not necessarily perform very
efficiently on the home front e.g., Italy and France. Finally, (iii) Countries with
good environmental conditions whose banking industries at the same time operate
with high pure technical efficiency levels e.g., Luxembourg, Belgium, Germany,
and the Netherlands.
In the first case reveals that if average banks from any of the European
countries decide to perform banking activities in Portugal, Spain or Denmark, it
will operate with lower average basic efficiency levels relative to its own
efficiency levels in the domestic market. This result suggests that an adverse
environmental condition could be an exogenous good competitive strategy for the
home banking industry.
In the second case, we observe that in terms of basic efficiency scores, Italian
and French banks are dominated in their own domestic markets by other European
banking industries. This suggests that advantageous environmental conditions are
helpful for superior banking activity for all, but the home country banks’ own
efficiency disadvantages could make the home banking industry experience even
more competition.
Finally, the third case suggests that advantageous environmental conditions in
countries like Luxembourg, Netherlands, Belgium or Germany provide
opportunities for foreign banks to perform efficiently on their own turf. However,
the efficiency level of home banking industries dominates the banking industries
involved in cross-border activities only in the cases where the home banking
industry account with higher pure technical efficiency than the foreign banking
industries. Therefore, it is apparent that being very technical efficient could be an
effective strategy to deter foreign competition.
As we analyzed the cross-country average bank efficiency scores among
European banks when they decide to operate in each other’s territory, we also
recognize the importance of understanding and investigating the individual
influence of the factors associated with environmental conditions. In other words,
understanding the marginal influence of environmental variables used to explain
pure technical efficiency levels obtained across border.
The procedure used for selecting the environmental variables permits us to
determine the influence exerted by each of the variables in the banking
performance. Table 5 contains such information, where the value of λ j by column
gives information about the accumulate influence of environmental variables in
each particular country. We observe that each environmental variable seems to18
play a particular role in the improvement of average efficiency scores of each
country. For example the environmental variable DD is which exercises a more
negative influence in the environment of Luxembourg and Netherlands. However,
for Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and UK it is the variable IB. On the
other hand, SC is a major factor for Denmark and Germany.
Given this information, we evaluate how each of these variables affects the
performance of average banks in foreign countries. Tables 6, 7 and 8 contain such
information. Interestingly, the environmental variables which seem to play the
most important role in explaining the cross country efficiency behavior are related
to the main economic conditions and the accessibility of banking services of each
country. This suggests that for cross-border competition in Europe, banks would




Belgium Denmark France Germany Italy Luxemb. Netherl. Portugal Spain UK
DD 1/1.14 1/1.66 1/1.28 1/1.46 1/1.03 1/1.19 1/1.23 1/1.31 1/1.33 1/1.27
DD+IB 1/1.88 1/1.86 1/1.62 1/1.69 1/1.30 1/1.19 1/1.38 1/4.97 1/4.21 1/1.57
DD+IB+EOTA 1/1.88 1/1.87 1/1.69 1/1.70 1/1.30 1/1.26 1/1.38 1/4.97 1/4.32 1/2.66


























Belgium ￿￿￿￿￿ 29.03 37.65 33.01 46.79 40.50 39.18 36.79 36.23 37.95
Denmark 28.95 ￿￿￿￿￿ 25.78 22.60 32.04 27.73 26.83 25.15 24.81 25.98
France 27.13 18.63 ￿￿￿￿￿ 21.18 30.03 25.99 25.14 23.61 23.26 24.35
Germany 34.11 23.43 30.38 ￿￿￿￿￿ 37.76 32.68 31.62 29.69 29.24 30.62
Italy 23.09 15.86 20.56 18.03 ￿￿￿￿￿ 22.12 21.40 20.09 19.79 20.72
Luxemb. 51.46 35.34 45.84 40.18 56.96 ￿￿￿￿￿ 47.70 44.79 44.11 46.20
Netherl. 40.33 27.70 36.92 31.49 44.64 38.64 ￿￿￿￿￿ 35.10 34.57 36.21
Portugal 18.32 12.58 16.32 14.31 20.28 17.55 16.98 ￿￿￿￿￿ 15.71 16.45
Spain 22.03 15.13 19.62 17.20 24.39 21.11 20.42 19.17 ￿￿￿￿￿ 19.78


























Belgium ￿￿￿￿￿ 42.65 48.96 46.93 61.02 66.66 57.48 15.96 18.85 50.52
Denmark 19.77 ￿￿￿￿￿ 22.94 21.99 28.59 31.23 26.93 7.47 8.83 23.67
France 20.82 20.04 ￿￿￿￿￿ 23.16 30.11 32.89 28.36 7.88 9.30 24.93
Germany 23.94 24.19 27.78 ￿￿￿￿￿ 34.62 37.82 32.61 9.05 10.69 28.66
Italy 17.56 17.74 20.37 19.53 ￿￿￿￿￿ 27.73 23.91 6.64 7.84 21.02
Luxemb. 31.43 31.76 36.47 34.96 45.53 ￿￿￿￿￿ 42.81 11.89 14.04 37.63
Netherl. 27.50 27.79 31.91 30.59 39.76 43.44 ￿￿￿￿￿ 10.40 12.28 32.92
Portugal 42.28 42.72 49.05 47.02 61.13 66.78 57.59 ￿￿￿￿￿ 18.88 50.62
Spain 42.34 42.79 49.13 47.10 61.22 66.88 57.68 16.01 ￿￿￿￿￿ 50.70


























Belgium ￿￿￿￿￿ 42.42 46.93 46.66 61.02 62.95 57.48 15.96 18.36 29.82
Denmark 19.85 ￿￿￿￿￿ 22.08 21.95 28.70 29.61 27.04 7.51 8.64 14.03
France 21.80 21.91 ￿￿￿￿￿ 24.11 31.52 32.52 29.70 8.25 9.49 15.41
Germany 24.06 24.19 26.77 ￿￿￿￿￿ 34.80 35.90 32.78 9.10 10.47 17.01
Italy 17.60 17.69 19.58 19.46 ￿￿￿￿￿ 26.26 23.98 6.66 7.66 12.44
Luxemb. 33.14 33.32 36.86 36.65 47.92 ￿￿￿￿￿ 45.14 12.54 14.42 23.42
Netherl. 27.52 27.66 30.60 30.42 39.79 41.05 ￿￿￿￿￿ 10.41 11.97 19.44
Portugal 42.28 42.50 46.02 46.75 61.13 63.07 57.59 ￿￿￿￿￿ 18.40 29.88
Spain 43.45 43.67 48.33 48.04 62.82 64.82 59.18 16.43 ￿￿￿￿￿ 30.70
UK 31.20 31.36 34.70 34.50 45.12 46.55 42.50 11.80 13.58 ￿￿￿￿￿
6 Conclusions
The increased intra-national and cross-border consolidations of financial
intermediaries around the world have attracted the attention of policy makers,
researchers, and managers regarding the competitive status, strategy and
performance among institutions in the new environment. Such an issue is more
pertinent in the European context given all the recent initiatives undertaken for an
integrated and harmonized union. Most cross-country comparisons of bank
performance to date have ignored the existence of unique economic, regulatory,
supervisory, and demographic, (i.e., environmental) conditions in each country in
evaluating relative bank performance.
This paper takes a systematic and detailed empirical initiative to quantify
bank efficiency conditions for each European banking industry if it begins to
operate in any other foreign country. First, the paper attempts to evaluate the
efficiency scores of banking industries operating in their own respective countries.
Later, improving on traditional models, the paper uses a common frontier to
control for the environmental conditions of each country. Such incorporation of
local conditions provides a fair comparison of different banking systems by
reporting efficiency scores for average bank in each country operating in other
countries.
Overall, the results based on cross-country efficiency scores suggest that the
banks from Spain, Denmark, Portugal and Belgium are relatively more efficient in
their own respective countries and successful in maintaining high levels of scores
if they decide to move to any other sample European country. This also means
that it would be harder for banks from other countries to establish profitable
networks in Spain, Portugal or Denmark due to adverse environmental conditions.
Incidentally, the banks from France and Italy are found to be less efficient
institutions across the board.
From a competitive point of view the results suggest that an adverse
(advantageous) environmental condition could be an exogenous good (bad)
competitive strategy for the home banking industry. Moreover, being technical
efficient enough seems to be a good strategy to deter foreign competition.20
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